mirror of
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
synced 2026-07-13 07:27:41 +00:00
bircni
f69e15afe7
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
54 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
54 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2019 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package setting
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import (
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"net/url"
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"gitea.dev/modules/log"
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)
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// Webhook settings
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var Webhook = struct {
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QueueLength int
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DeliverTimeout int
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SkipTLSVerify bool
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AllowedHostList string
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Types []string
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PagingNum int
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ProxyURL string
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ProxyURLFixed *url.URL
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ProxyHosts []string
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}{
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QueueLength: 1000,
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DeliverTimeout: 5,
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SkipTLSVerify: false,
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PagingNum: 10,
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ProxyURL: "",
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ProxyHosts: []string{},
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}
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func loadWebhookFrom(rootCfg ConfigProvider) {
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sec := rootCfg.Section("webhook")
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Webhook.QueueLength = sec.Key("QUEUE_LENGTH").MustInt(1000)
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Webhook.DeliverTimeout = sec.Key("DELIVER_TIMEOUT").MustInt(5)
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Webhook.SkipTLSVerify = sec.Key("SKIP_TLS_VERIFY").MustBool()
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deprecatedSetting(rootCfg, "webhook", "ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", "security", "ALLOWED_HOST_LIST", "v28.0.0")
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Webhook.AllowedHostList = sec.Key("ALLOWED_HOST_LIST").MustString(Security.AllowedHostList)
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Webhook.Types = []string{"gitea", "gogs", "slack", "discord", "dingtalk", "telegram", "msteams", "feishu", "matrix", "wechatwork", "packagist"}
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Webhook.PagingNum = sec.Key("PAGING_NUM").MustInt(10)
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Webhook.ProxyURL = sec.Key("PROXY_URL").MustString("")
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if Webhook.ProxyURL != "" {
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var err error
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Webhook.ProxyURLFixed, err = url.Parse(Webhook.ProxyURL)
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if err != nil {
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log.Error("Webhook PROXY_URL is not valid")
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Webhook.ProxyURL = ""
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}
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}
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Webhook.ProxyHosts = sec.Key("PROXY_HOSTS").Strings(",")
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}
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