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Giteabot
de4b8277e9
Backport #38406 by @bircni Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com> Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
41 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
41 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package integration
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import (
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
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"gitea.dev/tests"
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)
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// TestRepoHomeContentTokenScopes ensures the web repository home page enforces the
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// repository read scope (and public-only confinement) of an API token used via basic
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// auth, so a wrongly-scoped token cannot read private repository content.
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func TestRepoHomeContentTokenScopes(t *testing.T) {
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defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
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// user2/repo2 is a private repository owned by user2
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const url = "/user2/repo2"
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// a token without repository scope must be denied
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miscToken := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadMisc)
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reqDenied := NewRequest(t, "GET", url)
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reqDenied.SetBasicAuth("user2", miscToken)
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MakeRequest(t, reqDenied, http.StatusForbidden)
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// a public-only token must be denied on a private repo
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publicOnlyToken := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)
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reqPublicOnly := NewRequest(t, "GET", url)
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reqPublicOnly.SetBasicAuth("user2", publicOnlyToken)
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MakeRequest(t, reqPublicOnly, http.StatusForbidden)
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// a token with repository read scope is allowed
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ownerReadToken := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository)
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reqAllowed := NewRequest(t, "GET", url)
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reqAllowed.SetBasicAuth("user2", ownerReadToken)
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MakeRequest(t, reqAllowed, http.StatusOK)
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}
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