Files
Gitea/routers/private/hook_pre_receive_test.go
T
Giteabot 2734504cfc fix(actions): allow Actions bot to push to protected branches (#38284) (#38293)
Backport #38284 by @bircni

Fixes #38278

## Problem

When branch protection matches the branch an Actions workflow pushes to,
the runner's `git push` is rejected — even though the workflow token has
`contents: write` and the same push performed with a PAT (write access)
succeeds. Disabling protection or changing the pattern so it no longer
matches makes the push work.

## Root cause

In `preReceiveBranch` (`routers/private/hook_pre_receive.go`), the "can
the doer push to this protected branch" check resolves the pusher with
`user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, ctx.opts.UserID)`. For an Actions push the
user ID is `-2` (the virtual `ActionsUserID`), which has no database
row, so the lookup fails. Even past that, `CanUserPush` →
`HasAccessUnit`/whitelist membership cannot evaluate a virtual user and
returns `false`. As a result the Actions bot was rejected on every
matching protected branch, despite the earlier `assertCanWriteRef`
already confirming the token's code-write via
`GetActionsUserRepoPermission`.

This was inconsistent: a PAT with identical write access passed the
exact same check.

## Fix

Evaluate the Actions bot against its already-computed token permission
instead of a user lookup, mirroring the existing
`IsUserMergeWhitelisted` pattern:

- Add `CanActionsUserPush` / `CanActionsUserForcePush` on
`ProtectedBranch`, which take the precomputed `access_model.Permission`.
- Allow the push when push is enabled, **no** push whitelist is
enforced, and the token has code-write.
- Keep the bot blocked when a whitelist is enforced — it cannot be added
to one, so it must use a pull request. This preserves the whitelist as a
real security boundary.

Force-push, signed-commit and protected-file-path checks are untouched.

Signed-off-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
2026-07-01 11:46:17 +02:00

70 lines
2.7 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package private
import (
"testing"
issues_model "gitea.dev/models/issues"
"gitea.dev/models/perm/access"
repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
"gitea.dev/modules/git"
"gitea.dev/services/contexttest"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestPreReceiveCanWriteCodePerBranch ensures the maintainer-edit write grant is evaluated against
// the exact ref being pushed on every call, derived from that ref rather than shared mutable state.
// Otherwise a per-branch grant (an open PR with "allow edits from maintainers") could be batched
// together with a protected branch or a tag to escalate into full repository write.
func TestPreReceiveCanWriteCodePerBranch(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
baseRepo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 10})
headRepo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 11})
require.NoError(t, baseRepo.LoadOwner(t.Context()))
require.NoError(t, headRepo.LoadOwner(t.Context()))
// An open PR from the head repo owner, with maintainer edits allowed: this grants the base
// repo owner write access to exactly this head branch and nothing else.
pr := &issues_model.PullRequest{
Issue: &issues_model.Issue{
RepoID: baseRepo.ID,
PosterID: headRepo.OwnerID,
},
HeadRepoID: headRepo.ID,
BaseRepoID: baseRepo.ID,
HeadBranch: "granted-branch",
BaseBranch: "master",
AllowMaintainerEdit: true,
}
require.NoError(t, issues_model.NewPullRequest(t.Context(), baseRepo, pr.Issue, nil, nil, pr))
// The pusher is the base repo owner (the maintainer) with only read access on the head repo.
maintainer := baseRepo.Owner
headPerm, err := access.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission(t.Context(), headRepo, maintainer)
require.NoError(t, err)
mockCtx, _ := contexttest.MockPrivateContext(t, "/")
ctx := &preReceiveContext{
PrivateContext: mockCtx,
user: maintainer,
userPerm: headPerm,
}
// The granted branch must be writable...
assert.True(t, ctx.canWriteCodeRef(git.RefNameFromBranch("granted-branch")))
// ...but another branch in the same push must NOT inherit that grant.
assert.False(t, ctx.canWriteCodeRef(git.RefNameFromBranch("master")))
// ...and a tag sharing the granted branch's name must NOT inherit it either: the grant is
// scoped to PR head branches, so a non-branch ref can never match it. (A tag ref already
// yields an empty branch name, so this guards the per-ref evaluation, not the IsBranch check.)
assert.False(t, ctx.canWriteCodeRef(git.RefNameFromTag("granted-branch")))
}