Files
Gitea/models/repo/user_repo.go
T
Giteabot de4b8277e9 fix: various security fixes (#38406) (#38426)
Backport #38406 by @bircni

Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
2026-07-12 17:41:58 +00:00

189 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2022 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package repo
import (
"context"
"strings"
"gitea.dev/models/db"
"gitea.dev/models/organization"
"gitea.dev/models/perm"
"gitea.dev/models/unit"
user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
"gitea.dev/modules/container"
"xorm.io/builder"
)
type StarredReposOptions struct {
db.ListOptions
StarrerID int64
RepoOwnerID int64
IncludePrivate bool
// Actor is the user the private repositories are gated on: a private repo is only
// returned when Actor still has access to it, even if it was starred while access was granted.
Actor *user_model.User
}
func (opts *StarredReposOptions) ApplyPublicOnly(publicOnly bool) {
if publicOnly {
opts.IncludePrivate = false
}
}
func (opts *StarredReposOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
var cond builder.Cond = builder.Eq{
"star.uid": opts.StarrerID,
}
if opts.RepoOwnerID != 0 {
cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{
"repository.owner_id": opts.RepoOwnerID,
})
}
if opts.IncludePrivate {
// only include private repos the actor can still access, so metadata does not leak after access revocation
cond = cond.And(AccessibleRepositoryCondition(opts.Actor, unit.TypeInvalid))
} else {
// a public repo under a limited/private owner is not publicly reachable, so exclude it too
cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
}
return cond
}
func (opts *StarredReposOptions) ToJoins() []db.JoinFunc {
return []db.JoinFunc{
func(e db.Engine) error {
e.Join("INNER", "star", "`repository`.id=`star`.repo_id")
return nil
},
}
}
// GetStarredRepos returns the repos starred by a particular user
func GetStarredRepos(ctx context.Context, opts *StarredReposOptions) ([]*Repository, error) {
return db.Find[Repository](ctx, opts)
}
type WatchedReposOptions struct {
db.ListOptions
WatcherID int64
RepoOwnerID int64
IncludePrivate bool
// Actor is the user the private repositories are gated on: a private repo is only
// returned when Actor still has access to it, even if it was watched while access was granted.
Actor *user_model.User
}
func (opts *WatchedReposOptions) ApplyPublicOnly(publicOnly bool) {
if publicOnly {
opts.IncludePrivate = false
}
}
func (opts *WatchedReposOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
var cond builder.Cond = builder.Eq{
"watch.user_id": opts.WatcherID,
}
if opts.RepoOwnerID != 0 {
cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{
"repository.owner_id": opts.RepoOwnerID,
})
}
if opts.IncludePrivate {
// only include private repos the actor can still access, so metadata does not leak after access revocation
cond = cond.And(AccessibleRepositoryCondition(opts.Actor, unit.TypeInvalid))
} else {
// a public repo under a limited/private owner is not publicly reachable, so exclude it too
cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
}
return cond.And(builder.Neq{
"watch.mode": WatchModeDont,
})
}
func (opts *WatchedReposOptions) ToJoins() []db.JoinFunc {
return []db.JoinFunc{
func(e db.Engine) error {
e.Join("INNER", "watch", "`repository`.id=`watch`.repo_id")
return nil
},
}
}
// GetWatchedRepos returns the repos watched by a particular user
func GetWatchedRepos(ctx context.Context, opts *WatchedReposOptions) ([]*Repository, int64, error) {
return db.FindAndCount[Repository](ctx, opts)
}
// GetRepoAssignees returns all users that have write access and can be assigned to issues or pull-requests of the repository,
func GetRepoAssignees(ctx context.Context, repo *Repository) (_ []*user_model.User, err error) {
if err = repo.LoadOwner(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
e := db.GetEngine(ctx)
userIDs := make([]int64, 0, 10)
if err = e.Table("access").
Where("repo_id = ? AND mode >= ?", repo.ID, perm.AccessModeWrite).
Select("user_id").
Find(&userIDs); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
uniqueUserIDs := make(container.Set[int64])
uniqueUserIDs.AddMultiple(userIDs...)
if repo.Owner.IsOrganization() {
// issues and pull requests both need "assignee list"
additionalUserIDs, err := organization.GetTeamUserIDsWithAccessToAnyRepoUnit(ctx, repo.OwnerID, repo.ID, perm.AccessModeRead, unit.TypeIssues, unit.TypePullRequests)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
uniqueUserIDs.AddMultiple(additionalUserIDs...)
}
// Leave a seat for owner itself to append later, but if owner is an organization
// and just waste 1 unit is cheaper than re-allocate memory once.
users := make([]*user_model.User, 0, len(uniqueUserIDs)+1)
if len(uniqueUserIDs) > 0 {
if err = e.In("id", uniqueUserIDs.Values()).
Where(builder.Eq{"`user`.is_active": true}).
OrderBy(user_model.GetOrderByName()).
Find(&users); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if !repo.Owner.IsOrganization() && !uniqueUserIDs.Contains(repo.OwnerID) {
users = append(users, repo.Owner)
}
return users, nil
}
// GetIssuePostersWithSearch returns users with limit of 30 whose username started with prefix that have authored an issue/pull request for the given repository
// It searches with the "user.name" and "user.full_name" fields case-insensitively.
func GetIssuePostersWithSearch(ctx context.Context, repo *Repository, isPull bool, search string) ([]*user_model.User, error) {
users := make([]*user_model.User, 0, 30)
cond := builder.In("`user`.id",
builder.Select("poster_id").From("issue").Where(
builder.Eq{"repo_id": repo.ID}.
And(builder.Eq{"is_pull": isPull}),
).GroupBy("poster_id"))
if search != "" {
var prefixCond builder.Cond = builder.Like{"lower_name", strings.ToLower(search) + "%"}
prefixCond = prefixCond.Or(db.BuildCaseInsensitiveLike("full_name", "%"+search+"%"))
cond = cond.And(prefixCond)
}
return users, db.GetEngine(ctx).
Where(cond).
Cols("id", "name", "full_name", "avatar", "avatar_email", "use_custom_avatar").
OrderBy("name").
Limit(30).
Find(&users)
}