- Enforce org visibility on organization label read endpoints (private
org labels no longer leak to non-members).
- Block fork sync (`merge-upstream`) when the base repo is no longer
readable (stops pulling commits after a parent goes private).
- Remove `REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT` / `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` from
the Docker `app.ini` templates (the `= *` default allowed
`X-WEBAUTH-USER` impersonation; reverse-proxy auth is now opt-in and
admin-configured).
- Enforce single-use TOTP passcodes across web login, password-reset,
and Basic-Auth `X-Gitea-OTP` (fixes a TOCTOU race and a stateless
replay).
- Re-check branch write permission for every ref in a push (the
pre-receive hook cached the first ref's result, letting a per-branch
maintainer-edit grant escalate to full repo write).
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Fix#880
Design:
1. A global setting `security.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH`.
* To support org-level config, we need to introduce a better "owner
setting" system first (in the future)
2. A user without 2FA can login and may explore, but can NOT read or
write to any repositories via API/web.
3. Keep things as simple as possible.
* This option only aggressively suggest users to enable their 2FA at the
moment, it does NOT guarantee that users must have 2FA before all other
operations, it should be good enough for real world use cases.
* Some details and tests could be improved in the future since this
change only adds a check and seems won't affect too much.
---------
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Fixes#27819
We have support for two factor logins with the normal web login and with
basic auth. For basic auth the two factor check was implemented at three
different places and you need to know that this check is necessary. This
PR moves the check into the basic auth itself.
