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fix: various security fixes (#38406)
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
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// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package integration
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import (
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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"gitea.dev/tests"
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)
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// TestUpdateIssueLabelForeignLabel verifies that the web issue-label action rejects a
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// label owned by a different repo/org with 404 (indistinguishable from a nonexistent
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// id), closing the cross-repo label enumeration oracle also on the web side.
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func TestUpdateIssueLabelForeignLabel(t *testing.T) {
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defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
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sess := loginUser(t, "user2")
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// label 3 belongs to org3 — foreign to user2/repo1 (issue 1); must be 404, not a 500 oracle
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req := NewRequestWithValues(t, "POST", "/user2/repo1/issues/labels?issue_ids=1", map[string]string{
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"action": "attach",
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"id": "3",
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})
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sess.MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
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// a label owned by the repo still attaches normally
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req = NewRequestWithValues(t, "POST", "/user2/repo1/issues/labels?issue_ids=1", map[string]string{
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"action": "attach",
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"id": "2",
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})
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sess.MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
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}
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