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fix: various security fixes (#38406)
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
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"gitea.dev/tests"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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@@ -58,3 +59,51 @@ func TestFeedUser(t *testing.T) {
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})
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})
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}
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// TestFeedUserPublicOnlyToken ensures a public-only API token cannot surface a user's
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// private activity through their profile feed, even when authenticated as the owner.
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func TestFeedUserPublicOnlyToken(t *testing.T) {
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defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
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// user2 has activity on the private repo user2/repo2
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const privateMarker = "user2/repo2"
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// a normal read:user token authenticated as the owner sees private activity
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fullToken := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser)
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reqFull := NewRequest(t, "GET", "/user2.rss")
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reqFull.SetBasicAuth("user2", fullToken)
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respFull := MakeRequest(t, reqFull, http.StatusOK)
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assert.Contains(t, respFull.Body.String(), privateMarker)
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// a public-only token must not surface the private activity
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publicOnlyToken := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)
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reqPublicOnly := NewRequest(t, "GET", "/user2.rss")
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reqPublicOnly.SetBasicAuth("user2", publicOnlyToken)
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respPublicOnly := MakeRequest(t, reqPublicOnly, http.StatusOK)
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assert.NotContains(t, respPublicOnly.Body.String(), privateMarker)
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}
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// TestProfileActivityPublicOnlyToken ensures the HTML profile activity tab does not
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// surface a user's private activity to a public-only API token, mirroring the RSS/Atom
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// guard. The /{username} route is AllowBasic, so a public-only PAT used as the Basic
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// password must still be downgraded even for the feed owner.
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func TestProfileActivityPublicOnlyToken(t *testing.T) {
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defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
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// user2 has activity on the private repo user2/repo2
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const privateMarker = "user2/repo2"
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// a normal read:user token authenticated as the owner sees private activity
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fullToken := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser)
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reqFull := NewRequest(t, "GET", "/user2?tab=activity")
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reqFull.SetBasicAuth("user2", fullToken)
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respFull := MakeRequest(t, reqFull, http.StatusOK)
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assert.Contains(t, respFull.Body.String(), privateMarker)
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// a public-only token must not surface the private activity
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publicOnlyToken := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)
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reqPublicOnly := NewRequest(t, "GET", "/user2?tab=activity")
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reqPublicOnly.SetBasicAuth("user2", publicOnlyToken)
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respPublicOnly := MakeRequest(t, reqPublicOnly, http.StatusOK)
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assert.NotContains(t, respPublicOnly.Body.String(), privateMarker)
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}
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