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fix: various security fixes (#38406)
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
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@@ -30,6 +30,62 @@ func TestAPICreateAndDeleteToken(t *testing.T) {
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deleteAPIAccessToken(t, newAccessToken, user)
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}
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// TestAPICreateTokenScopeEscalation ensures a token-authenticated request cannot
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// mint a new token with a broader scope than the authenticating token.
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func TestAPICreateTokenScopeEscalation(t *testing.T) {
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defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
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user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
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// a write:user-scoped token authenticates the create requests below
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writeUserToken := getUserToken(t, user.Name, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
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// requesting a broader scope ("all") than the authenticating token is rejected
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req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/users/"+user.LoginName+"/tokens", map[string]any{
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"name": "escalated",
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"scopes": []string{"all"},
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})
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req.Request.SetBasicAuth(user.Name, writeUserToken)
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MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusForbidden)
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// requesting a subset scope ("read:user") is allowed
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req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/users/"+user.LoginName+"/tokens", map[string]any{
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"name": "subset",
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"scopes": []string{"read:user"},
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})
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req.Request.SetBasicAuth(user.Name, writeUserToken)
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MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
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// password (non-token) auth may still create a token with any scope
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req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/users/"+user.LoginName+"/tokens", map[string]any{
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"name": "by-password",
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"scopes": []string{"all"},
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}).AddBasicAuth(user.Name)
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MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
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// a public-only token must not mint a token that drops the public-only restriction
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publicOnlyToken := getUserToken(t, user.Name, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)
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req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/users/"+user.LoginName+"/tokens", map[string]any{
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"name": "still-public-only",
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"scopes": []string{"write:user"},
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})
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req.Request.SetBasicAuth(user.Name, publicOnlyToken)
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resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
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var createdToken api.AccessToken
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DecodeJSON(t, resp, &createdToken)
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assert.Contains(t, createdToken.Scopes, string(auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly))
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// an unrestricted parent token may create a narrower public-only child: public-only is a restriction,
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// not a grantable permission, so the subset check must not reject it
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req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/users/"+user.LoginName+"/tokens", map[string]any{
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"name": "narrower-public-only",
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"scopes": []string{"write:user", "public-only"},
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})
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req.Request.SetBasicAuth(user.Name, writeUserToken)
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resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
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DecodeJSON(t, resp, &createdToken)
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assert.Contains(t, createdToken.Scopes, string(auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly))
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}
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// TestAPIDeleteMissingToken ensures that error is thrown when token not found
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func TestAPIDeleteMissingToken(t *testing.T) {
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defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
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