Gitea-John71/Gitea
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git synced 2026-08-04 08:27:31 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

fix: various security fixes (#38406)

Browse Source 
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-07-12 19:14:09 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d2bd1589fe
commit f69e15afe7
93 changed files with 1715 additions and 138 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
tests/integration/api_packages_generic_test.go
+29
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
neturl "net/url"
"testing"
auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
"gitea.dev/models/packages"
"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
@@ -262,3 +263,31 @@ func TestPackageGeneric(t *testing.T) {
})
})
}
// TestPackageGenericPublicOnlyTokenLimitedOwner ensures a public-only token cannot
// access packages owned by a limited-visibility owner (only genuinely public owners).
func TestPackageGenericPublicOnlyTokenLimitedOwner(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
// user33 has limited visibility (visible only to authenticated users, not public)
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 33})
base := fmt.Sprintf("/api/packages/%s/generic/pkg/1.0.0", owner.Name)
// upload a package into the limited owner's namespace
req := NewRequestWithBody(t, "PUT", base+"/file.bin", bytes.NewReader([]byte{1, 2, 3})).
AddBasicAuth(owner.Name)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
// a public-only read:package token (even the owner's own) must be refused
publicOnlyToken := getUserToken(t, owner.Name, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadPackage, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", base+"/file.bin").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusForbidden)
// same via the v1 package API surface (checkTokenPublicOnly)
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/packages/%s/generic/pkg/1.0.0", owner.Name)).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusForbidden)
// a normal read:package token still works, proving only public-only is restricted
token := getUserToken(t, owner.Name, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadPackage)
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", base+"/file.bin").AddTokenAuth(token)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
}