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fix: various security fixes (#38406)

Browse Source 
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-07-12 19:14:09 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d2bd1589fe
commit f69e15afe7
93 changed files with 1715 additions and 138 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
services/auth/auth_token.go
+4
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ func CheckAuthToken(ctx context.Context, value string) (*auth_model.AuthToken, e
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(t.TokenHash), []byte(hex.EncodeToString(hashedToken[:]))) == 0 {
// If an attacker steals a token and uses the token to create a new session the hash gets updated.
// When the victim uses the old token the hashes don't match anymore and the victim should be notified about the compromised token.
// Revoke the token so the attacker's rotated token (which shares this ID) can no longer be used.
if err := auth_model.DeleteAuthTokenByID(ctx, t.ID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return nil, ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash
}
services/auth/auth_token_test.go
+4 -1
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"
"gitea.dev/modules/util"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
@@ -62,7 +63,9 @@ func TestCheckAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash)
assert.Nil(t, at2)
assert.NoError(t, auth_model.DeleteAuthTokenByID(t.Context(), at.ID))
// a hash mismatch signals a compromised token, which must be revoked
_, err = auth_model.GetAuthTokenByID(t.Context(), at.ID)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
})
t.Run("Valid", func(t *testing.T) {