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fix: various security fixes (#38406)

Browse Source 
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-07-12 19:14:09 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d2bd1589fe
commit f69e15afe7
93 changed files with 1715 additions and 138 deletions
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routers/api/v1/shared/action.go
+17
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,21 @@ import (
"gitea.dev/routers/api/v1/utils"
"gitea.dev/services/context"
"gitea.dev/services/convert"
"xorm.io/builder"
)
// actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery returns the sub-query restricting an owner-scoped actions
// listing to the repos whose actions the caller can read, or nil when no restriction applies. A bare
// org member must not be able to enumerate runs/jobs of repos they have no access to. A site admin may
// skip the access filter, but a public-only token must stay confined to public repos even for an admin.
func actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID int64) *builder.Builder {
if ownerID > 0 && (ctx.Doer == nil || !ctx.Doer.IsAdmin || ctx.PublicOnly) {
return repo_model.FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery(ownerID, ctx.Doer, ctx.PublicOnly)
}
return nil
}
// ListJobs lists jobs for api route validated ownerID and repoID
// ownerID == 0 and repoID == 0 means all jobs
// ownerID == 0 and repoID != 0 means all jobs for the given repo
@@ -60,6 +73,8 @@ func ListJobs(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID, repoID, runID int64, runAttemptI
opts.Statuses = append(opts.Statuses, values...)
}
opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx, opts.OwnerID)
jobs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, opts)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
@@ -181,6 +196,8 @@ func ListRuns(ctx *context.APIContext, ownerID, repoID int64, workflowID string)
}
excludePullRequests := ctx.FormBool("exclude_pull_requests")
opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery = actionsOwnerAccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery(ctx, opts.OwnerID)
runs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)