fix: various security fixes (#38406)

Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-07-12 19:14:09 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d2bd1589fe
commit f69e15afe7
93 changed files with 1715 additions and 138 deletions
+23
View File
@@ -89,3 +89,26 @@ func TestAccessTokenScope_HasScope(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestAccessTokenScope_EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
in AccessTokenScope
parent AccessTokenScope
out AccessTokenScope
}{
// public-only parent forces the restriction onto the minted scope
{"write:user", "write:user,public-only", "public-only,write:user"},
// already public-only stays public-only
{"public-only,read:user", "public-only", "public-only,read:user"},
// non-public-only parent leaves the scope untouched
{"write:user", "write:user", "write:user"},
{"all", "all", "all"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(string(test.parent)+"->"+string(test.in), func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := test.in.EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(test.parent)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, test.out, got)
})
}
}