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fix: various security fixes (#38406)

Browse Source 
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-07-12 19:14:09 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d2bd1589fe
commit f69e15afe7
93 changed files with 1715 additions and 138 deletions
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models/actions/run_job_list.go
+7
View File
@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ type FindRunJobOptions struct {
UpdatedBefore timeutil.TimeStamp
ConcurrencyGroup string
OrderBy db.SearchOrderBy
// AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery, when non-nil, restricts results to the repo IDs selected by the
// subquery (the caller's accessible repos). A nil value means no restriction. Using a subquery
// instead of a materialized ID slice avoids exceeding DB parameter limits for large owners.
AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery *builder.Builder
}
var JobOrderByMap = map[string]map[string]db.SearchOrderBy{
@@ -132,6 +136,9 @@ func (opts FindRunJobOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
}
cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"`action_run_job`.concurrency_group": opts.ConcurrencyGroup})
}
if opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery != nil {
cond = cond.And(builder.In("`action_run_job`.repo_id", opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery))
}
return cond
}
models/actions/run_list.go
+7
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ type FindRunOptions struct {
Status []Status
ConcurrencyGroup string
CommitSHA string
// AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery, when non-nil, restricts results to the repo IDs selected by the
// subquery (the caller's accessible repos). A nil value means no restriction. Using a subquery
// instead of a materialized ID slice avoids exceeding DB parameter limits for large owners.
AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery *builder.Builder
}
func (opts FindRunOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
@@ -101,6 +105,9 @@ func (opts FindRunOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
if opts.CommitSHA != "" {
cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"`action_run`.commit_sha": opts.CommitSHA})
}
if opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery != nil {
cond = cond.And(builder.In("`action_run`.repo_id", opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery))
}
return cond
}