fix: various security fixes (#38406) (#38426)

Backport #38406 by @bircni

Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:

- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.

### 📌 Attention for site admins

Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:

- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.

Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>

models/actions/run_job_list.go

@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ type FindRunJobOptions struct {
 	UpdatedBefore    timeutil.TimeStamp
 	ConcurrencyGroup string
 	OrderBy          db.SearchOrderBy
+	// AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery, when non-nil, restricts results to the repo IDs selected by the
+	// subquery (the caller's accessible repos). A nil value means no restriction. Using a subquery
+	// instead of a materialized ID slice avoids exceeding DB parameter limits for large owners.
+	AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery *builder.Builder
 }
 
 var JobOrderByMap = map[string]map[string]db.SearchOrderBy{
@@ -132,6 +136,9 @@ func (opts FindRunJobOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 		}
 		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"`action_run_job`.concurrency_group": opts.ConcurrencyGroup})
 	}
+	if opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery != nil {
+		cond = cond.And(builder.In("`action_run_job`.repo_id", opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery))
+	}
 	return cond
 }
 

models/actions/run_list.go

@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ type FindRunOptions struct {
 	Status           []Status
 	ConcurrencyGroup string
 	CommitSHA        string
+	// AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery, when non-nil, restricts results to the repo IDs selected by the
+	// subquery (the caller's accessible repos). A nil value means no restriction. Using a subquery
+	// instead of a materialized ID slice avoids exceeding DB parameter limits for large owners.
+	AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery *builder.Builder
 }
 
 func (opts FindRunOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
@@ -101,6 +105,9 @@ func (opts FindRunOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 	if opts.CommitSHA != "" {
 		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"`action_run`.commit_sha": opts.CommitSHA})
 	}
+	if opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery != nil {
+		cond = cond.And(builder.In("`action_run`.repo_id", opts.AccessibleRepoIDsSubQuery))
+	}
 	return cond
 }
 

models/asymkey/ssh_key_parse.go

@@ -36,7 +36,18 @@ import (
 
 const ssh2keyStart = "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
 
+const (
+	// the longest RSA key ssh-keygen allows to generate is 16384 bits (2048 bytes), we still relax the limit a little here
+	maxKeyBinaryBytes        = 4096
+	maxKeyContentBase64Bytes = maxKeyBinaryBytes * 4 / 3
+	maxKeyContentExtraBytes  = 4 * 1024 // header, footer, comment
+	maxKeyContentBytes       = maxKeyContentBase64Bytes + maxKeyContentExtraBytes
+)
+
 func extractTypeFromBase64Key(key string) (string, error) {
+	if len(key) > maxKeyContentBase64Bytes {
+		return "", util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("SSH public key base64 is too long")
+	}
 	b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(key)
 	if err != nil || len(b) < 4 {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid key format: %w", err)
@@ -52,6 +63,10 @@ func extractTypeFromBase64Key(key string) (string, error) {
 
 // parseKeyString parses any key string in OpenSSH or SSH2 format to clean OpenSSH string (RFC4253).
 func parseKeyString(content string) (string, error) {
+	if len(content) > maxKeyContentBytes {
+		return "", util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("SSH public key content is too long")
+	}
+
 	// remove whitespace at start and end
 	content = strings.TrimSpace(content)
 
@@ -63,6 +78,8 @@ func parseKeyString(content string) (string, error) {
 		// Transform all legal line endings to a single "\n".
 		content = strings.NewReplacer("\r\n", "\n", "\r", "\n").Replace(content)
 
+		var b strings.Builder
+		b.Grow(len(content))
 		lines := strings.Split(content, "\n")
 		continuationLine := false
 
@@ -74,9 +91,10 @@ func parseKeyString(content string) (string, error) {
 			if continuationLine || strings.ContainsAny(line, ":-") {
 				continuationLine = strings.HasSuffix(line, "\\")
 			} else {
-				keyContent += line
+				b.WriteString(line)
 			}
 		}
+		keyContent = b.String()
 
 		t, err := extractTypeFromBase64Key(keyContent)
 		if err != nil {

models/asymkey/ssh_key_test.go

@@ -473,10 +473,20 @@ func runErr(t *testing.T, stdin []byte, args ...string) {
 	}
 }
 
-func Test_PublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t *testing.T) {
+func TestPublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t *testing.T) {
 	key1 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &PublicKey{ID: 1})
 	externals, err := PublicKeysAreExternallyManaged(t.Context(), []*PublicKey{key1})
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Len(t, externals, 1)
 	assert.False(t, externals[0])
 }
+
+// TestCheckPublicKeyStringOversized tests if oversized SSH2 public key strings are rejected before triggering costly operations.
+func TestCheckPublicKeyStringOversized(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := parseKeyString(strings.Repeat("a", maxKeyContentBytes+1))
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "SSH public key content is too long")
+
+	content := "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n" + strings.Repeat("a", maxKeyContentBase64Bytes+1) + "\n--- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+	_, err = parseKeyString(content)
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "SSH public key base64 is too long")
+}

models/auth/access_token_scope.go

@@ -304,6 +304,36 @@ func (s AccessTokenScope) PublicOnly() (bool, error) {
 	return bitmap.hasScope(AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)
 }
 
+// CanCreateChildScope reports whether a request authenticated by this (parent) scope may mint a token
+// carrying the child scope. It rejects any grantable scope the parent does not hold, closing the
+// scope-escalation path. public-only is a restriction rather than a grantable permission, so it is
+// ignored here (a child may always be public-only); EnforcePublicOnlyFrom handles carrying it down.
+func (s AccessTokenScope) CanCreateChildScope(child AccessTokenScope) (bool, error) {
+	requested := child.StringSlice()
+	scopes := make([]AccessTokenScope, 0, len(requested))
+	for _, sc := range requested {
+		childScope := AccessTokenScope(sc)
+		if childScope == AccessTokenScopePublicOnly {
+			continue
+		}
+		scopes = append(scopes, childScope)
+	}
+	return s.HasScope(scopes...)
+}
+
+// EnforcePublicOnlyFrom adds the public-only restriction to s when the authorizing parent scope is
+// public-only, so a public-only token cannot mint a child token that drops the restriction.
+func (s AccessTokenScope) EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(parent AccessTokenScope) (AccessTokenScope, error) {
+	publicOnly, err := parent.PublicOnly()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if !publicOnly {
+		return s, nil
+	}
+	return AccessTokenScope(string(s) + "," + string(AccessTokenScopePublicOnly)).Normalize()
+}
+
 // HasScope returns true if the string has the given scope
 func (s AccessTokenScope) HasScope(scopes ...AccessTokenScope) (bool, error) {
 	bitmap, err := s.parse()

models/auth/access_token_scope_test.go

@@ -89,3 +89,26 @@ func TestAccessTokenScope_HasScope(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestAccessTokenScope_EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		in     AccessTokenScope
+		parent AccessTokenScope
+		out    AccessTokenScope
+	}{
+		// public-only parent forces the restriction onto the minted scope
+		{"write:user", "write:user,public-only", "public-only,write:user"},
+		// already public-only stays public-only
+		{"public-only,read:user", "public-only", "public-only,read:user"},
+		// non-public-only parent leaves the scope untouched
+		{"write:user", "write:user", "write:user"},
+		{"all", "all", "all"},
+	}
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(string(test.parent)+"->"+string(test.in), func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := test.in.EnforcePublicOnlyFrom(test.parent)
+			assert.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, test.out, got)
+		})
+	}
+}

models/issues/comment.go

@@ -627,11 +627,18 @@ func UpdateCommentAttachments(ctx context.Context, c *Comment, uuids []string) e
 		return nil
 	}
 	return db.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		issue, err := GetIssueByID(ctx, c.IssueID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		attachments, err := repo_model.GetAttachmentsByUUIDs(ctx, uuids)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("getAttachmentsByUUIDs [uuids: %v]: %w", uuids, err)
 		}
 		for i := range attachments {
+			if err := validateAttachmentForIssue(ctx, issue, attachments[i]); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 			attachments[i].IssueID = c.IssueID
 			attachments[i].CommentID = c.ID
 			if err := repo_model.UpdateAttachment(ctx, attachments[i]); err != nil {

models/issues/comment_test.go

@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ func Test_UpdateCommentAttachment(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
 
 	comment := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Comment{ID: 1})
+	issue := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Issue{ID: comment.IssueID})
 	attachment := repo_model.Attachment{
-		Name: "test.txt",
+		RepoID: issue.RepoID, // must match the comment's repo, else the cross-repo guard rejects it
+		Name:   "test.txt",
 	}
 	assert.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &attachment))
 

models/issues/issue_update.go

@@ -263,14 +263,46 @@ func AddDeletePRBranchComment(ctx context.Context, doer *user_model.User, repo *
 	return err
 }
 
+// validateAttachmentForIssue rejects a foreign or already-linked attachment before it is linked to
+// issue: a known UUID could otherwise re-link (and expose) another repo's private attachment. A
+// legacy attachment predating repo_id-on-upload is adopted into the issue's repo.
+func validateAttachmentForIssue(ctx context.Context, issue *Issue, attachment *repo_model.Attachment) error {
+	if attachment.RepoID == 0 && attachment.CreatedUnix < repo_model.LegacyAttachmentMissingRepoIDCutoff {
+		attachment.RepoID = issue.RepoID
+		if err := repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(ctx, attachment, "repo_id"); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("update attachment repo_id [id: %d]: %w", attachment.ID, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if attachment.RepoID != issue.RepoID {
+		return util.NewPermissionDeniedErrorf("attachment belongs to a different repository")
+	}
+	if attachment.IssueID != 0 && attachment.IssueID != issue.ID {
+		return util.NewPermissionDeniedErrorf("attachment is already linked to another issue")
+	}
+	if attachment.ReleaseID != 0 {
+		return util.NewPermissionDeniedErrorf("attachment is already linked to a release")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // UpdateIssueAttachments update attachments by UUIDs for the issue
 func UpdateIssueAttachments(ctx context.Context, issueID int64, uuids []string) (err error) {
+	if len(uuids) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
 	return db.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		issue, err := GetIssueByID(ctx, issueID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		attachments, err := repo_model.GetAttachmentsByUUIDs(ctx, uuids)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("getAttachmentsByUUIDs [uuids: %v]: %w", uuids, err)
 		}
 		for i := range attachments {
+			if err := validateAttachmentForIssue(ctx, issue, attachments[i]); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 			attachments[i].IssueID = issueID
 			if err := repo_model.UpdateAttachment(ctx, attachments[i]); err != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("update attachment [id: %d]: %w", attachments[i].ID, err)

models/issues/issue_update_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package issues_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	issues_model "gitea.dev/models/issues"
+	repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
+	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/util"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestUpdateIssueAttachmentsCrossRepo(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+
+	// attachment id 2 belongs to repo 2 / issue 4; issue 1 lives in repo 1
+	issue1 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Issue{ID: 1})
+	foreign := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Attachment{ID: 2})
+	require.NotEqual(t, issue1.RepoID, foreign.RepoID)
+
+	// re-linking a foreign repo's attachment by UUID must be rejected
+	err := issues_model.UpdateIssueAttachments(t.Context(), issue1.ID, []string{foreign.UUID})
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrPermissionDenied)
+
+	// the foreign attachment must be left untouched
+	reloaded := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Attachment{ID: 2})
+	assert.Equal(t, foreign.IssueID, reloaded.IssueID)
+}

models/issues/label.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package issues
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"slices"
 	"strconv"
@@ -27,12 +28,6 @@ type ErrRepoLabelNotExist struct {
 	RepoID  int64
 }
 
-// IsErrRepoLabelNotExist checks if an error is a RepoErrLabelNotExist.
-func IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err error) bool {
-	_, ok := err.(ErrRepoLabelNotExist)
-	return ok
-}
-
 func (err ErrRepoLabelNotExist) Error() string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("label does not exist [label_id: %d, repo_id: %d]", err.LabelID, err.RepoID)
 }
@@ -312,6 +307,18 @@ func GetLabelInRepoByName(ctx context.Context, repoID int64, labelName string) (
 	return l, nil
 }
 
+// GetLabelInRepoOrOrgByID returns the label with labelID scoped to the repo, falling back to the
+// repo's owning organization when ownerIsOrg is set. It returns ErrRepoLabelNotExist /
+// ErrOrgLabelNotExist when the label is in neither scope, so a foreign-but-existing label ID is
+// indistinguishable from a nonexistent one (no cross-repo enumeration oracle).
+func GetLabelInRepoOrOrgByID(ctx context.Context, repoID, ownerID int64, ownerIsOrg bool, labelID int64) (*Label, error) {
+	label, err := GetLabelInRepoByID(ctx, repoID, labelID)
+	if err != nil && errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) && ownerIsOrg {
+		return GetLabelInOrgByID(ctx, ownerID, labelID)
+	}
+	return label, err
+}
+
 // GetLabelInRepoByID returns a label by ID in given repository.
 func GetLabelInRepoByID(ctx context.Context, repoID, labelID int64) (*Label, error) {
 	if labelID <= 0 || repoID <= 0 {

models/issues/label_test.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/timeutil"
+	"gitea.dev/modules/util"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 )
@@ -94,10 +95,10 @@ func TestGetLabelInRepoByName(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, "label1", label.Name)
 
 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByName(t.Context(), 1, "")
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
 
 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByName(t.Context(), unittest.NonexistentID, "nonexistent")
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
 }
 
 func TestGetLabelInRepoByNames(t *testing.T) {
@@ -131,10 +132,10 @@ func TestGetLabelInRepoByID(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.EqualValues(t, 1, label.ID)
 
 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByID(t.Context(), 1, -1)
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
 
 	_, err = issues_model.GetLabelInRepoByID(t.Context(), unittest.NonexistentID, unittest.NonexistentID)
-	assert.True(t, issues_model.IsErrRepoLabelNotExist(err))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, util.ErrNotExist)
 }
 
 func TestGetLabelsInRepoByIDs(t *testing.T) {

models/repo/repo_list.go

@@ -310,11 +310,17 @@ func userOrgTeamRepoBuilder(userID int64) *builder.Builder {
 }
 
 // userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder returns repo ids where user's teams can access the special unit.
+// A team grants the unit either through an explicit team_unit row (access_mode > none) or by being an
+// admin/owner team (team.authorize >= admin), which grants every unit regardless of team_unit rows —
+// mirroring the HasAdminAccess() short-circuit in access.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission.
 func userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder(userID int64, unitType unit.Type) *builder.Builder {
 	return userOrgTeamRepoBuilder(userID).
-		Join("INNER", "team_unit", "`team_unit`.team_id = `team_repo`.team_id").
-		Where(builder.Eq{"`team_unit`.`type`": unitType}).
-		And(builder.Gt{"`team_unit`.`access_mode`": int(perm.AccessModeNone)})
+		Join("INNER", "team", "`team`.id = `team_repo`.team_id").
+		Join("LEFT", "team_unit", builder.Expr("`team_unit`.team_id = `team_repo`.team_id AND `team_unit`.`type` = ?", unitType)).
+		Where(builder.Or(
+			builder.Gte{"`team`.authorize": int(perm.AccessModeAdmin)},
+			builder.Gt{"`team_unit`.`access_mode`": int(perm.AccessModeNone)},
+		))
 }
 
 // userOrgTeamUnitRepoCond returns a condition to select repo ids where user's teams can access the special unit.
@@ -326,7 +332,7 @@ func userOrgTeamUnitRepoCond(idStr string, userID int64, unitType unit.Type) bui
 func UserOrgUnitRepoCond(idStr string, userID, orgID int64, unitType unit.Type) builder.Cond {
 	return builder.In(idStr,
 		userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder(userID, unitType).
-			And(builder.Eq{"`team_unit`.org_id": orgID}),
+			And(builder.Eq{"`team`.org_id": orgID}),
 	)
 }
 
@@ -755,6 +761,40 @@ func FindUserCodeAccessibleOwnerRepoIDs(ctx context.Context, ownerID int64, user
 	))
 }
 
+// PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond restricts to public repos whose owner is publicly visible: the
+// "genuinely public" set a public-only token or an anonymous caller may see (a public repo under a
+// limited/private owner is not publicly reachable and must be excluded).
+func PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond() builder.Cond {
+	return builder.And(
+		builder.Eq{"`repository`.is_private": false},
+		builder.In("`repository`.owner_id", builder.Select("id").From("`user`").Where(builder.Eq{"visibility": structs.VisibleTypePublic})),
+	)
+}
+
+// UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond selects the repos owned by ownerID whose Actions `user` may read.
+// It is used to list an org/user's Actions runs and jobs (see the callers in routers/api/v1/shared).
+//   - owner_id = ownerID: only that owner's repos.
+//   - AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, TypeActions): only repos whose Actions the user can read
+//     (admin/owner teams are handled inside it; a site admin is not, callers must skip the filter for one).
+//   - publicOnly (a public-only token): additionally limit to public repos under a public owner.
+func UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(ownerID int64, user *user_model.User, publicOnly bool) builder.Cond {
+	cond := builder.NewCond().And(
+		builder.Eq{"`repository`.owner_id": ownerID},
+		AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeActions),
+	)
+	if publicOnly {
+		cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
+	}
+	return cond
+}
+
+// FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery returns a subquery selecting the repository IDs the user
+// can see for the given owner. Callers embed it in an `IN (...)` condition so that a large owner does not
+// materialize every repo ID into the SQL statement, which could exceed database parameter limits.
+func FindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDsSubQuery(ownerID int64, user *user_model.User, publicOnly bool) *builder.Builder {
+	return builder.Select("id").From("repository").Where(UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(ownerID, user, publicOnly))
+}
+
 // GetUserRepositories returns a list of repositories of given user.
 func GetUserRepositories(ctx context.Context, opts SearchRepoOptions) (RepositoryList, int64, error) {
 	if len(opts.OrderBy) == 0 {

models/repo/repo_list_test.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 
 	"gitea.dev/models/db"
 	repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
+	"gitea.dev/models/unit"
 	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
 	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
 	"gitea.dev/modules/optional"
@@ -466,3 +467,50 @@ func TestSearchRepositoryByTopicName(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestFindUserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoIDs(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+	// user2 is on org3's owner team, so it can access org3's private repo3 (which has the actions unit)
+	user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
+
+	// org3 is a public org owning repo3 (private) and repo32 (public), both with the actions unit
+	const orgID = 3
+
+	all, err := repo_model.SearchRepositoryIDsByCondition(t.Context(), repo_model.UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(orgID, user, false))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, all, int64(3), "without public-only the private repo's actions are listed")
+
+	publicOnly, err := repo_model.SearchRepositoryIDsByCondition(t.Context(), repo_model.UserActionsAccessibleOwnerRepoCond(orgID, user, true))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotContains(t, publicOnly, int64(3), "a public-only token must not list a private repo's actions")
+	assert.Contains(t, publicOnly, int64(32), "a public repo under a public owner stays listed")
+}
+
+// TestUserOrgUnitRepoCondTeamAuthorize pins the team.authorize behavior of userOrgTeamUnitRepoBuilder
+// (exercised through UserOrgUnitRepoCond): an admin/owner team grants every unit even without an explicit
+// team_unit row, while a non-admin team only grants a unit it has an explicit row for. This guards both
+// directions — hiding repos from admin-team members, and over-broadening a plain team's access.
+func TestUserOrgUnitRepoCondTeamAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+
+	accessibleRepoIDs := func(userID, orgID int64, unitType unit.Type) []int64 {
+		ids, err := repo_model.SearchRepositoryIDsByCondition(t.Context(),
+			repo_model.UserOrgUnitRepoCond("`repository`.id", userID, orgID, unitType))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		return ids
+	}
+
+	// Case A: user18 is only on org17's owner team (team5, authorize=owner), linked to the private repo24
+	// but with no Actions team_unit row. The owner authorize must still grant it, mirroring the runtime
+	// HasAdminAccess() short-circuit in access.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission.
+	assert.Contains(t, accessibleRepoIDs(18, 17, unit.TypeActions), int64(24),
+		"an owner team grants a unit it has no explicit team_unit row for")
+
+	// Cases B and C share one subject so the team_unit row is the only difference: user4 is only on org3's
+	// write team (team2, authorize=write, non-admin), linked to the private repo3. team2 has an explicit
+	// Projects row but none for Actions.
+	assert.Contains(t, accessibleRepoIDs(4, 3, unit.TypeProjects), int64(3),
+		"a non-admin team grants a unit it has an explicit team_unit row for")
+	assert.NotContains(t, accessibleRepoIDs(4, 3, unit.TypeActions), int64(3),
+		"a non-admin team must NOT grant a unit it has no team_unit row for")
+}

models/repo/user_repo.go

@@ -46,9 +46,8 @@ func (opts *StarredReposOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 		// only include private repos the actor can still access, so metadata does not leak after access revocation
 		cond = cond.And(AccessibleRepositoryCondition(opts.Actor, unit.TypeInvalid))
 	} else {
-		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{
-			"repository.is_private": false,
-		})
+		// a public repo under a limited/private owner is not publicly reachable, so exclude it too
+		cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
 	}
 	return cond
 }
@@ -96,9 +95,8 @@ func (opts *WatchedReposOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
 		// only include private repos the actor can still access, so metadata does not leak after access revocation
 		cond = cond.And(AccessibleRepositoryCondition(opts.Actor, unit.TypeInvalid))
 	} else {
-		cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{
-			"repository.is_private": false,
-		})
+		// a public repo under a limited/private owner is not publicly reachable, so exclude it too
+		cond = cond.And(PublicRepoUnderPublicOwnerCond())
 	}
 	return cond.And(builder.Neq{
 		"watch.mode": WatchModeDont,

models/repo/user_repo_test.go

@@ -84,3 +84,40 @@ func testUserRepoGetIssuePostersWithSearch(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Len(t, users, 1)
 	assert.Equal(t, "user2", users[0].Name)
 }
+
+func TestStarredWatchedReposExcludeNonPublicOwners(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+
+	const viewerID = 2
+	// repo1: public repo under a public owner; repo38: public repo under a limited org (not publicly reachable)
+	const publicOwnerRepo, limitedOwnerRepo = 1, 38
+
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Star{UID: viewerID, RepoID: publicOwnerRepo}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Star{UID: viewerID, RepoID: limitedOwnerRepo}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Watch{UserID: viewerID, RepoID: publicOwnerRepo, Mode: repo_model.WatchModeNormal}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Insert(t.Context(), &repo_model.Watch{UserID: viewerID, RepoID: limitedOwnerRepo, Mode: repo_model.WatchModeNormal}))
+
+	listOpts := db.ListOptions{Page: 1, PageSize: 50}
+
+	starred, err := repo_model.GetStarredRepos(t.Context(), &repo_model.StarredReposOptions{
+		ListOptions: listOpts, StarrerID: viewerID, IncludePrivate: false,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotContains(t, repoIDs(starred), int64(limitedOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a limited owner must be hidden from a public star listing")
+	assert.Contains(t, repoIDs(starred), int64(publicOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a public owner stays visible")
+
+	watched, _, err := repo_model.GetWatchedRepos(t.Context(), &repo_model.WatchedReposOptions{
+		ListOptions: listOpts, WatcherID: viewerID, IncludePrivate: false,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotContains(t, repoIDs(watched), int64(limitedOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a limited owner must be hidden from a public watch listing")
+	assert.Contains(t, repoIDs(watched), int64(publicOwnerRepo), "a public repo under a public owner stays visible")
+}
+
+func repoIDs(repos []*repo_model.Repository) []int64 {
+	ids := make([]int64, len(repos))
+	for i, r := range repos {
+		ids[i] = r.ID
+	}
+	return ids
+}