fix: Various security fixes (#38103) (#38151)

Backport #38103

- Enforce org visibility on organization label read endpoints (private
org labels no longer leak to non-members).
- Block fork sync (`merge-upstream`) when the base repo is no longer
readable (stops pulling commits after a parent goes private).
- Remove `REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT` / `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` from
the Docker `app.ini` templates (the `= *` default allowed
`X-WEBAUTH-USER` impersonation; reverse-proxy auth is now opt-in and
admin-configured).
- Enforce single-use TOTP passcodes across web login, password-reset,
and Basic-Auth `X-Gitea-OTP` (fixes a TOCTOU race and a stateless
replay).
- Re-check branch write permission for every ref in a push (the
pre-receive hook cached the first ref's result, letting a per-branch
maintainer-edit grant escalate to full repo write).

---------

Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-06-17 22:49:59 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent f6e2ca4388
commit 99f8b3d9a1
16 changed files with 337 additions and 82 deletions
+2 -1
View File
@@ -176,7 +176,8 @@ func validateTOTP(req *http.Request, u *user_model.User) error {
}
return err
}
if ok, err := twofa.ValidateTOTP(req.Header.Get("X-Gitea-OTP")); err != nil {
// Consume the passcode atomically so a captured OTP cannot be replayed within its validity window.
if ok, err := twofa.ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(req.Context(), req.Header.Get("X-Gitea-OTP")); err != nil {
return err
} else if !ok {
return util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("invalid provided OTP")