fix: Various security fixes (#38103)

- Enforce org visibility on organization label read endpoints (private
org labels no longer leak to non-members).
- Block fork sync (`merge-upstream`) when the base repo is no longer
readable (stops pulling commits after a parent goes private).
- Remove `REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT` / `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` from
the Docker `app.ini` templates (the `= *` default allowed
`X-WEBAUTH-USER` impersonation; reverse-proxy auth is now opt-in and
admin-configured).
- Enforce single-use TOTP passcodes across web login, password-reset,
and Basic-Auth `X-Gitea-OTP` (fixes a TOCTOU race and a stateless
replay).
- Re-check branch write permission for every ref in a push (the
pre-receive hook cached the first ref's result, letting a per-branch
maintainer-edit grant escalate to full repo write).

---------

Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
bircni
2026-06-17 18:06:51 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent c68925152b
commit 68692e19d4
16 changed files with 280 additions and 48 deletions
+48
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"time"
auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
issues_model "gitea.dev/models/issues"
org_model "gitea.dev/models/organization"
"gitea.dev/models/perm"
repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
@@ -292,3 +293,50 @@ func testAPIDeleteOrgRepos(t *testing.T) {
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNoContent) // The org contains no repositories, so the API should return StatusNoContent
})
}
// TestAPIOrgLabelsVisibility ensures the organization label read endpoints honor
// the organization visibility: labels of a private org must not be disclosed to
// users who cannot see the org (GHSA: unauthorized access to private org labels).
func TestAPIOrgLabelsVisibility(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
// privated_org (id 23) is a private organization; user5 is its only member.
privateOrg := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &org_model.Organization{ID: 23})
label := &issues_model.Label{OrgID: privateOrg.ID, Name: "internal-label", Color: "#aabbcc", Description: "private organization label"}
require.NoError(t, issues_model.NewLabel(t.Context(), label))
listURL := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/orgs/%s/labels", privateOrg.Name)
getURL := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/orgs/%s/labels/%d", privateOrg.Name, label.ID)
t.Run("NonMemberDenied", func(t *testing.T) {
// user2 is not a member of the private org and must not see its labels.
token := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadOrganization)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", listURL).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusNotFound)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", getURL).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusNotFound)
})
t.Run("AnonymousDenied", func(t *testing.T) {
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", listURL), http.StatusNotFound)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", getURL), http.StatusNotFound)
})
t.Run("MemberAllowed", func(t *testing.T) {
token := getUserToken(t, "user5", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadOrganization)
resp := MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", listURL).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusOK)
labels := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &[]*api.Label{})
assert.Len(t, *labels, 1)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", getURL).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusOK)
})
t.Run("SiteAdminAllowed", func(t *testing.T) {
token := getUserToken(t, "user1", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadOrganization)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", listURL).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusOK)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", getURL).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusOK)
})
t.Run("PublicOrgStillReadable", func(t *testing.T) {
// org3 (id 3) is a public org with labels; non-members may read them.
token := getUserToken(t, "user2", auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadOrganization)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/orgs/org3/labels").AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusOK)
})
}